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The Issues to be Considered
 General principles and

requirements
 Comments on alignment of funding and
governance in the NHHRC Interim Report

General principles and requirements

What we need regardless of the option
 A national health

charter
 National policy and planning
 National health intelligence and information
 National regulation
 Regional planning and delivery
 Strengthen primary health care and improve the
integration of 'health' and 'aged' care
 Recognise that change is a process
Dwyer J and Eagar K (2008) Options for reform of Commonwealth and State governance
responsibilities for the Australian health system. NHHRC discussion paper
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Six Design Principles
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 Only fix

what's broken
 Enact national leadership
 The system must be designed as a system, with
coherent roles, authorities and accountabilities
 All service integration is local
 Accountability for funding and commissioning
health care is just as important as accountability
for providing care
 Maintain the universality of Medicare
Dwyer J and Eagar K (2008) Options for reform of Commonwealth and State governance
responsibilities for the Australian health system. NHHRC discussion paper
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System design is not a set of free choices
 The design

of national health systems is not a
single problem with a single right answer.
 Elements must be aligned: policies, funding
arrangements, skills, roles and accountabilities
come as packages:
– we need change precisely because of the current
lack of such alignment.

Centre for Health Service Development

Leutz Laws of Service Integration
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1. You can integrate some of the services for all the

people, and all the services for some of the people,
but you can't integrate all of the services for all of
the people.
2. Integration costs before it pays.
3. Your integration is my fragmentation.
4. You can't integrate a square peg and a round hole.
5. The one who integrates calls the tune.
6. All integration is local.

Selective comments on alignment of
funding and governance in the
NHHRC Interim Report
The devil is in the detail

Governance and funding reforms
in the interim report
 The devil

–
–
–
–
–

is in the detail, including:

Chap 2 - primary health care
Chap 8 - Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health
Chap 9 - remote and rural health
Chap 11 - oral health
Chap 12 - governance options

 Mixed funding

fee for service (FFS), case payments, capitation, pay for
performance (P4P), regional grants, other grants
 not necessarily aligned to governance and management
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Option A Shared responsibility
with clearer accountability
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 Retain role

for both Commonwealth and state and but
change responsibilities. Commonwealth:
– responsible for all primary health care funding and policy


including community health ($4 billion of state $ to transfer to
Commonwealth)

– pay states and territories using casemix for inpatient,
emergency department and hospital outpatient treatments
– report is silent on how community health would be
managed under this option

Option B. Commonwealth
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 Commonwealth solely responsible for

public
health care, delivered through regional statutory
health authorities (RHAs).
– The way universities are funded

 RHAs responsible for managing

hospitals and
community health in parallel to continued national
programs
– provision for states and territories to become the RHA

 States would

transfer $24 billion (existing state
health $) to the Commonwealth

Option C. Social insurance
 Compulsory social insurance to
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fund local delivery.

– tax-funded community insurance scheme
– instead of Medicare, multiple, competing health plans for
people to choose from, which would be required to cover
a mandatory set of services including hospital, medical,
pharmaceutical, allied health and aged care
 Report is silent on

how hospitals and community
health are managed under this option
 Report is also silent on how geographic equity would
be achieved
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Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
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 National Aboriginal and

Torres Strait Islander

Health Authority
– purchaser as per DVA for those who register
– from accredited providers


Community Controlled, mainstream services and hospitals
(presumably all accredited?)

– contracts with community controlled services
– direct billing (FFS) for other services


presumably case payments for hospitals?

– essentially, NATSIHA is the health plan in Option C

Rural and remote
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 Population needs-based funding

– Who holds the funds under the 3 options?
– Presumably excludes those who register with the
National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health
Authority?
 Expand multi-purpose services to

12,000
– auspice body under the 3 options?

populations of

Primary care
 Principal of
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equity in provision of PHC funding

– but inconsistent proposals elsewhere about how this
would be achieved
 C’wealth funds community health (CH)

– Option A - silent on how CH is managed
30,000+ salaried community health staff across Australia
 what about hospital-managed CH?
 definition of primary care includes community mental health


– but hospital-based mental health stays with the states in Option A

– Option B - managed by regional statutory authority

Primary health care (2)
 Divisions of
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PHC

– ‘health stewardship’ and local planning, but not health
service management
 ‘Comprehensive PHC

Centres’

– offer initial fixed capital grants on a competitive basis


private for profit and NGO?

– assume that many CH staff would move to these?
 GPs

– mixed payments - FFS (including for prevention),
grant funding for enrolment, P4P

Three elephants in the room
 Hospitals

– how to manage them
– how to better manage demand
 Health insurance
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If we don’t fix
these 3, we
can’t fix the
health system!

 The fact that capped systems (eg, public

hospitals) have incentives to act in ways which are
fundamentally different to systems (eg, FFS) that
are uncapped
– NHHRC proposals mostly do not align the incentives

